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Abstract 
Danish farmers have been far less interested in agri-environmental subsidy schemes than anticipated. We use choice 
experiments to estimate 486 Danish farmers’ preferences for a number of policy relevant scheme-characteristics. 
Subsidy schemes for pesticide free buffer zones along hedgerows are used as a case and analysed using a random 
parameter logit framework. By quantifying farmers’ preferences in monetary values, we are able to assess the relative 
importance of individual scheme-characteristics. Farmer’s assessments of the administrative burden are captured by 
estimating how they value free-of-charge assistance for the application procedure. To our knowledge, this measure of 
administrative burden has not been tested before. Our results indicate that payment size was perceived to be the most 
important scheme characteristic narrowly followed by flexible contract terms (an option to cancel the contract and 
contract length) and still of significant importance but less so are practical management restrictions (choice of buffer 
zone width, using fertilizer, and reduced administrative burden). 
 
Keywords: Farmer preferences, participation, agri-environmental schemes, choice experiments 
 
 
1. Background  
Denmark has a long tradition of regulating the agricultural use of approved pesticides. The instruments have been a 
combination of pesticide taxes and voluntary measures such as subsidy schemes for pesticide free production, general 
information campaigns, subsidised advisory services at farm level of how to reduce pesticides use, subsidised pesticide 
reducing decision support systems, and publicly financed research in pest management. Particularly agri-environmental 
subsidy schemes (AES) have been widely used as they are encouraged by the Rural Development Fund under the 
present EU Common Agricultural Policy. Subsidy schemes for pesticide free buffer zones along streams and lakes have 
been offered to Danish farmers for more than a decade in order to safeguard aquatic environment and to avoid leaching 
of pesticides to the ground water – but with limited success among farmers (Christensen et al 2007; Pedersen et al 
2007). The limited uptake of AES among farmers has increased interest in identifying factors that determine farmers’ 
interest in AES.  
 
Danish farmers successfully decreased their pesticide use from around 7000 tonnes in 1981 to around 4000 tonnes of 
active ingredients in 2008 (Environmental Protection Agency, 2009). However, a large part of this development has 
been driven by the introduction of more effective pesticides per weight unit and as a consequence the pressure on the 
environment has not decreased at the same rate as the volume of pesticides. In order to obtain a better measure of 
environmental effects, the so-called treatment frequency index (TFI) was introduced and is now the main Danish 
indicator of the use of approved pesticides1. The latest Pesticide Plan III underlined that the new goal was to reach a TFI 
                                                      
1 The TFI represents the number of pesticide applications in the cultivated areas (calculated from the traded amount of 
pesticides that year), provided that a fixed standard dose is used. Uncultivated fallow fields, organically cultivated fields 
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of 1.7 at the end of 2009 as proposed by the Bichel Committee (Ministry of Environment & Ministry of Food, 
Agriculture and Fisheries 2003). However, the TFI has increased substantially since 2003 (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Development in the Danish pesticide use from 1997 to 2008 (measured as TFI) 
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
TFI 2.63 2.40 2.45 2.07 2.19 2.10 2.33 2.39 2.49 2.52 2.51 3.16 
TFI: Treatment frequency index. Source: Environmental Protection Agency (2000; 2003; 2006; 2009) 
 
Evaluations of the effectiveness of the pesticide plans (and AES in general) point to multiple explanations of what went 
wrong. One line of argument suggests that farming conditions have changed (changed input/output prices, changed 
crops, more aggressive pest attacks, etc.) and as a consequence, the economic incentives have not been high enough to 
induce farmers to change behaviour. For the Danish case, these arguments apply to the insufficient effect of the 
pesticide taxes as well as to the sparse interest among farmers in signing up for subsidy schemes for pesticide-free 
production (Christensen et al. 2007; Pedersen et al. 2007; Economic Council 2010). Another line of arguments pursued 
in the international literature, concerns transaction costs. Falconer (2000) suggested that transactions costs serve as 
barriers such that farmers’ perceived costs of complying with restrictions in a voluntary agreement exceed the values of 
their production losses. Mettepenningen et al. (2009 p. 663) estimated private transaction costs (defined as costs that are 
not related to changed profits) for European farmers as 14 % of total AES-related costs which was ‘considerably higher 
than indicated by previous research’. Both studies suggest that ways to reduce these transaction costs should be 
investigated in order to increase AES uptake. A particular motivation for research in private transaction costs is that 
AES payments under the EU common Agricultural Policy can exceed the costs of lost production by 20 % under the 
condition that the additional payments are used to cover documented transaction costs. A third line of arguments has 
recently emerged suggesting that farmers do not only optimize in economic terms but are also driven by other motives 
such as professional pride in high yield etc. (Nielsen, 2009; Burton et al. 2008; Mettepenningen et al. 2007; Gasson 
1973). Hence, there might be barriers in addition to the insufficient payment sizes and to what extent private transaction 
costs are compensated that need to be overcome before participation rates can increase. 
 
Fundamentally, participation barriers can be addressed from two different angles. One solution is to increase payments 
significantly in order to provide sufficiently attractive ‘entrance-values´.  However, there are a number of objections to 
this solution. Firstly, subsidy schemes tend to exhaust national budgets for environmental purposes rather quickly.  
Another obstacle against increasing payments is that, at the same time as the use of AES is encouraged by EU 
regulation – it is also restricted because of the 20 % ceiling on transactions costs. A third problem with increasing 
subsidy schemes is that it might not even affect the attractiveness of the schemes for farmers, especially those who are 
less motivated by non-economic values. Hence, increasing farmers’ participation by simply increasing subsidies may 
not be a viable solution. An alternative solution is to reduce transaction costs or non-economic barriers instead. 
Increasing interest has been shown towards understanding the determinants of when AES become a success – and when 
they do not. Several sociological studies have focused on identifying factors that affect farmers’ propensity to 
participate in AES. These studies indicate that contract specific factors such as flexibility and farmers’ levels of 
information are important (Wynn et al. 2001) just as shorter contracts are typically preferred to longer. Also, farmer and 
farm factors such as age, education, farm size and financial situation have been found to have a significant effect on 
participation rates (Siebert et al. 2006 provides an overview). Also having a social network that is positive towards 
subsidy schemes is found to affect farmer attitudes towards AES (DeFrancesco et al. 2008).  
 
The main purpose of the present paper is to elicit farmers’ preferences for a number of policy relevant characteristics of 
an AES. More specifically, we conduct a choice experiment in order to quantify Danish farmers’ preferences for 
subsidy schemes for pesticide free buffer zones along hedgerows. Thereby, we are able to estimate a monetary value of 
farmers’ potential barriers for reducing pesticide use. The barriers include the farmer’s perceived costs of production 
loss, transaction costs or costs of compromising professional pride. This methodological approach is inspired by Ruto & 
Garrod (2009). The intentions are that the results of our case study provide input to solving the ongoing problems of 
fulfilling the goals in Danish pesticide regulation. Our experiment includes a measure that has not been tested before, 
namely the use of farm extension service as a means to reduce transaction costs. The case and the statistical method 
employed will be presented below, followed by the empirical analyses leading to results that are discussed and 
concluded upon.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and constant grass fields are not defined as cultivated fields and therefore these types of fields are held out of the TFI 
calculation (Freier & Boller 2009, p.442) 
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2. The choice experiment approach  
2.1 Earlier studies 
For decades, economic valuation methods have been used to elicit consumer preferences within marketing and transport 
economics. Also within environmental economics, a large number of studies on how consumers value the 
environmental benefits of various policy initiatives have been conducted but studies that seek to use the same 
techniques to elicit farmer preferences for policy initiatives have only recently entered the scene. Such studies have 
typically focused on eliciting farmers’ preferences for AES. Indeed, these few studies provide promising new ways to 
force the farmers to elicit their preferences for and rankings of competing goals (such as for example, flexibility in farm 
management versus obtaining subsidies for undertaking specific changes in production). 
 
We found a handful of studies using choice experiments to elicit farmer preferences for AES. Ruto & Garrod (2009) 
investigated the role that scheme design can have on encouraging farmers to participate in AES. Their study involved 
10 European countries – not including Denmark. They investigated farmer preferences for 4 specific scheme 
characteristics: Contract length (5, 10, 20 years), flexibility in what areas of the farm are entered into the scheme (yes, 
no), flexibility in undertaking some of the measures required under the scheme (yes, no), average time spent on 
paperwork/administration (less than 2 hours per week, 2-5 hours per week or more than 5 hours per week). All four 
scheme attributes were found to be significant determinants of farmers’ decisions to participate in AES. By specifically 
interacting farm factors with contract length they found that age, education, successor, rent and finance are negatively 
related to contract length whereas environmental concern and farm size were positively related to contract length. 
Epinosa-Goded (2009) found that Spanish farmers where more willing to participate in AES when restrictions on farm 
management were small and that fixed payment could substantially reduce overall payments. Ducos et al. (2009) found 
that fixed transaction costs were a significant barrier to farmers’ interest in AES – particularly for small farms – and 
suggested that payments were provided in lump sums as well as yearly payments might decrease overall payments and 
at the same time increase participation rates.  
 
Using contingent valuation, Vanslembrouck et al. (2003) investigated Belgian farmers’ preferences for increasing 
landscape values. They found a group of farmers who were simply not interested in participating in a voluntary 
agreement (even though they could set the price themselves), that farmers were more reluctant to participate if they did 
not understand the environmental benefits involved, that buffer zones signalled sloppy farm management, and that 
many farmers prefer low-involvement agreements (even though the payments were also lower). Using a logit model, 
Wynn et al. (2001) found that flexibility was important for farmers’ decisions to participate in AES. 
 
These contributions point towards the potentials for trading off payments with changed scheme requirements and 
thereby possibly increase participation rates in AES without increasing environmental budgets. In particular, the 
qualitative as well as the quantitative studies suggest that flexibility is valuable. However, flexibility can be related to 
many decision levels ranging from flexibility in the overall contract terms and the environmental goals that are pursued 
to flexibility in practical management decision - and more detailed information is needed on the specific types of 
flexibility that farmers value the most. To this end, we especially focus on eliciting how farmer’s rank flexibility in 
overall contract terms vs. flexibility in practical management. A very recent study on Danish landowners’ interest in 
voluntary long-term afforestation schemes suggested that landowners had a strong preference for an option to denounce 
their contract within five or ten years which could reduce required subsidies. Also, reduced control by authorities could 
reduce required subsidies. Furthermore, landowners required lower subsidies when the purpose of afforestation was to 
protect biodiversity or groundwater compared to recreational purposes (Broch & Vedel 2010; Vedel, Jacobsen & 
Thorsen 2010). The latter studies are particularly interesting in relation to our study as they involve Danish landowners 
and they support our hypotheses that contract length and a denounce option are valuable also in a short term context of 
pesticide-free low payment buffer zones as we investigate.  
 
 
2.2 Method description 
The underlying assumption in estimating farmers’ valuation of scheme attributes is that the farmers’ choice of subsidy 
scheme depends on the specific requirements of the subsidy schemes (including the subsidy payments). Hence, the 
underlying theory of CE is based on Lancaster’s Consumer Theory (LCT) (Lancaster 1966) and random utility theory 
(Gravelle & Rees 1992, Luce 1959, McFadden 1974). According to Lancaster, the (indirect) utility Vij that individual i 
achieves from good j is the sum of the utilities obtained from each of the K characteristics skij where k= 1, 2, … ,K). We 
assume that the utility Vij is an additive function of attributes and can be written as follows: 
 
 (1) 
1 1 2 2 ..........ij i ij i ij Ki KijV s s sβ β β= + + +
4 
 
 
Random utility theory is based on the assumption that individuals make choices according to a deterministic part along 
with some degree of randomness. Allowing Uij to represent the random utility that individual i places on alternative j, Vij 
now represents the deterministic component of the utility function and εij is a random variable that captures the 
unsystematic and unobserved random element of individual i’s choice (Hanley et al. 2002, Holmes & Adamowicz 
2003). We will assume throughout the paper that the error terms are independent Gumbel distributions. An alternative 
specific constant (ASCi) has been included which captures the (systematic) utility of omitted variables. The ASC is 
modelled as a dummy that takes the value 0 if one of the two hypothetical alternatives is chosen and 1 if ‘none of these’ 
is chosen. A positive value of the ASC-dummy would suggest the presence of some elements not included in the 
present model that have a positive effect on the farmers’ utility of choosing ‘none of these’, see Adomowicz et al. 
(1998) and Meyerhoff & Liebe (2009). Hence, the random utility Uij can be represented as follows 
 
1 1 2 2 ..........ij ASCi i i ij i ij Ki Kij ijU ASC s s sβ β β β ε= + + + + +  (2) 
In a standard logit specification, all parameter coefficients are fixed. A random parameter model, as we applied, allows 
for variations in how the individual farmers value the scheme characteristics. Normal distributions are assumed for all 
non-price attributes (zone width, contract length, contract cancelling, fertiliser use, and free assistance) as well as the 
ASC (see also Goett et al. 2000, Revelt & Train 1998). This means that farmer valuations of these attributes can take 
positive as well as negative values. In order to measure preferences for all attributes in the same unit, i.e. money,  we 
estimate the marginal substitutions between non-monetary requirements and the subsidy size. Thereby, measures os 
willingness-to-accept (WTA) individual requirements are obtained. We assumed a constant price parameter, since this 
allows straight forward calculations of the distribution of WTA. The price is modelled as a continuous variable and all 
other attributes are modelled as effect coded dummy variables. The soft ware package Ngene is used to create the 
design. It is optimized with respect to C-efficient estimations of main effects given the restriction of 8 choice sets to 
each farmer and no blocks (http://choice-metrics.com/ ). A random parameter error correction model is estimated using 
Biogeme (Bierlaire, 2003).  
 
 
2.3 Our study - design and implementation 
Recent studies have focused on the usefulness of buffer zones to protect the terrestrial biodiversity (Bruus et al. 2008; 
Navntoft 2009). As buffer zones along hedgerows are not included in the present regulatory initiatives, the present study 
serves as useful input to future pesticide policies. 
 
The specific scheme characteristics included in the present study are greatly inspired by findings from earlier studies as 
well as by our own findings from a previous survey sent to the same farmers. In that survey, farmers were asked about 
the importance of a range of factors related to subsidy schemes for reducing environmental effects of pesticide use. The 
amount of paper work was the factor that the largest number of farmers categorized as very important – a total of 50 % 
indicated that it was very important for a decision to participate in a subsidy scheme. Uncertainty about being forced 
into permanent agreements was categorized as very important by 47 % of the respondents, and 43 % of the farmers 
found it very important that a subsidy would cover more than direct costs. Also of importance – but less so – was the 
degree to which the farmers ability to plan his field management was restricted (30 % stated that as very important) and 
the effect on the environment (23 % thought this was very important). Inspired by these results, we used a focus group 
to test specific formulations of scheme attributes that the group found meaningful and at the same time politically 
realistic. An overview of attributes used in the choice experiment is provided in Table 2.  
 
Contract flexibility was captured by including different contract lengths and by introducing a yearly option to be 
released from the contract. Description of the administrative burden caused some initial problems as it was not possible 
to find hourly estimates that were meaningful across farmers. Instead the possibility to be released from the 
administrative burden by obtaining assistance from the extension service was found to be a satisfactory indicator of the 
how much weight a farmer would place on the administrative burden.  In Denmark, the majority of farmers use the 
agricultural extension service for economic and field management advice as well as for applying for direct payment 
under the CAP. Hence, transaction costs involved in contacting an agricultural advisor for assistance for applying for an 
additional subsidy scheme are expected to be low. Variation in how much scheme requirements would limit actual field 
management was captured by introducing an attribute where artificial fertilizer might/might not be allowed in the 
pesticide free buffer zone. The policy importance of this attribute lies in the differences in environmental and economic 
effects of buffer zones depending on whether the buffer zones are ‘only’ pesticide free or whether they are also free 
from artificial fertilizer. Finally, the size of payments ranged from 1000 DDK (which is the present payment level for 
implementing buffer zones along waterways that was considered to be a lower bound due to the limited uptake) to 3800 
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DDK which was identified in the focus groups as sufficient for a dream-AES and in addition was similar to the yearly 
hectare premium used for establishing wetlands which has been a much larger success than other subsidy schemes).  
 
Table 2. Overview over possible requirements  in the subsidy schemes used in the choice experiment 
  Type of requirement Scheme requirement 
(attribute) 
 Detailed scheme requirement 
(attribute level)  
 
Flexibility in contract 
terms 
Contract length - 1 year 
- 5 years  
Release option -can be released from contract without costs once a year 
- cannot be released from contract 
 
 
Flexibility  in practical 
management  
 
Buffer zone width  - 6 meter  
-  between 6 and 24 meter (possibly the width of your mover)  
Changed agricultural 
practice  
- pesticides cannot be used in buffer zones 
-pesticides or artificial manure cannot be used in buffer zones 
 Application method   - application for subsidy on common application form 
- free assistance from extension service to send in application 
form  
 
Economic incentive 
Size of subsidy 
(Euro per hectare per 
year)  
 
134 Euro, 228 Euro, 336 Euro, 510 Euro  
Note: Attribute levels in bold are used as reference levels in the econometric estimations 
 
Table 2 together with a short introduction was presented to the respondents. The introduction explained the benefits to 
nature of buffer zones and that the subsidy schemes should be considered as independent and not covered by cross 
compliance. Each respondent was asked to complete 8 choice tasks. It should be noted that the first column which 
groups the 6 scheme attributes into 3 overall categories is included in the table for illustrational purposes in the present 
paper and were not presented to the respondents. The precise text and an example of a choice situation are presented in 
appendix. 
 
 
3. Results 
3.1 Descriptive statistics  
The survey was carried out in December 2009 and January 2010 within the Nielsen Company’s farmer web panel. A 
total of 486 responses were obtained (response rate of 45 %). Of these, 42 respondents were eliminated from the 
econometric analysis (see below) while the remaining 444 respondents (totalling 3552 observations) were used in the 
estimations.  
 
We report the most relevant descriptive statistics. The alternative none of these was chosen 22 % of the times. In order 
to eliminate potential protesters2, we identified the group of farmers who chose none of these in all 8 choice situations. 
Out of these, 42 respondents chose none of these every time because they partly or completely agreed that subsidy 
schemes have nothing to do with real farming. Responses from farmers who consequently chose none of these because 
they thought that the offered subsidy schemes were too unattractive or they were too alike were kept in the data set. 
With respect to representativeness, there is an overweight of younger farmers and large farms in the sample.  
 
A question concerning earlier participation in subsidy schemes revealed that 9 % of the respondents had previous 
experience which corresponds reasonably well with the actual uptake of existing subsidy schemes. Around 25 % of the 
farmers indicated that they do not have hedgerows on their farms which leave 75 % of the farms to be pre-qualified for 
the proposed subsidy schemes. We confronted the farmers with six statements concerning their perceptions of subsidy 
schemes. We found an overweight of farmers who did not consider subsidy schemes an easily obtained income and we 
found that a great deal of uncertainty about the consequences of enrolling in subsidy schemes was present among 
farmers in relation to how one subsidy scheme would be affected by other schemes, whether existing subsidy schemes 
were subject to the EU’s cross compliance regulation and to what extent authorities could be trusted (see Table 3).  
                                                      
2 We defined protesters as respondents who we expected chose none of these without considering the actual offers made 
by the hypothetical subsidy schemes 
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Table 3. Distribution of farmers perceptions of subsidy schemes, measured in % (N=486)  
Please state to what extent 
you agree or disagree with 
the following statements 
1 -
completely 
disagree 
2 – 
partly 
disagree 
3- 
neutral 
4-  
partly 
agree 
5- 
completely 
agree 
 
Don’t 
know 
My experiences with subsidy 
schemes are bad 
5 20 39 20 9 7 
It is an easy way to help the 
environment 
8 20 35 23 6 8 
It is an easy way to earn 
money 
14 22 36 15 5 8 
It is difficult to identify how 
various subsidy schemes 
affect each other 
 
1 
 
7 
 
16  
43 
 
20 
 
5 
I am uncertain about the 
consequences for my direct 
payments (cross-compliance) 
 
6 
 
13 
 
28  
30 
 
14 
 
8 
I do not trust the authorities 8 17 39 20 12 5 
 
 
3.2 Estimation results 
The econometric estimations indicated that all the investigated scheme requirements had a significant effect on farmers’ 
utility. More specifically, flexible zone widths were preferred to a fixed 6 meter wide zone and 1-year contracts were 
preferred to 5-year contracts. Also, positive values were attached to the option to be released from a contract without 
costs, to be able to use fertilizer in the buffer zone and to obtain assistance in the practical application process. Also as 
expected, farmers placed a positive value on higher subsidies. The results are shown in Table 4. An ’adjusted ρ2 = 0,26’ 
suggests that the model fit is indeed acceptable – typically, anything above 0.2 is considered as a good fit (Louviere et 
al. 2000) even though there is still a great deal of variation to explain.  
 
Table  4. Farmer WTA specific scheme requirements for implementing pesticide free buffer zones (N=444) 
 Mean values of attribute parameters Coefficient Robust 
Std err 
p-value Euro/ha/ 
Year 
Buffer zone width  -0,170 0,045 ~0 43 
Contract period  -0,499 0,043 ~0 128 
Release option  0,534 0,05 ~0 137 
Using fertilizer in the buffer zone - 0,430 0,06 ~0 110 
Application method  -0,203 0,05 ~0 52 
Size of subsidy 0,00109 6.9E-05 ~0  
ASC (alternative specific constant) 0,817 0,284 ~0 104 
Standard deviations of attribute parameters      
Buffer zone width  0,416 0,05 ~0 106 
Contract period  0,471 0,05 ~0 120 
Release option 0,461 0,08 ~0 118 
Using fertilizer in the buffer zone 0,877 0,071 ~0 224 
Application method  0,443 0,06 ~0 113 
ASC 3,46 0,224 ~0 442 
Adjusted ρ2 0,267    
Note: All coefficients are normally distributed except size of subsidy which is fixed. All variables are effect coded except price and 
ASC who are dummy coded. Coefficients relating to effect coded variables are multiplied by 2 before division with price-coefficient 
when Euro/ha/year is calculated. The reference levels for the Euro/ha/year (last column) are chosen such that they are all positive, 
while the reference levels for the parameter values (second column) are as specified in Table 2. We used simulations with 2000 
Halton draws.  
 
Analysing farmers’ value and ranking of the individual requirements is most easily communicated by looking at the 
average farmer’s WTA compensation for complying with each individual requirement by using money as a common 
denominator (last column in Table 4). All attributes except the price, can assume two levels. No absolute parameter 
values are estimated, only the increased value of facing a certain subsidy scheme relative to a reference level is 
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identified. For example, the estimated value of facing flexible zone width instead of 6 meter zones is 43 Euro/ha/year 
for an average farmer. Large and significant standard deviations of the normally distributed coefficients indicate that 
there is a great deal of heterogeneity in how farmers value the costs of the requirements. To continue our example, the 
standard deviation in how farmers value flexible zone width 106 Euro/ha/year.  
 
The ranking reveals a clustering in how important the requirements are perceived to be. Flexibilities in contract 
specifications seem to be the most important characteristics. This group includes the option of being released from the 
contract as well as short-term contracts. The second group involves flexibility in the practical management such as 
being allowed to use fertilizer, flexible zone width and being offered assistance in administrating the actual application 
for joining the subsidy scheme.  It should be noted though, that being allowed to use fertilizer seems to be far the most 
important characteristic in the second group. 
 
To supplement the choice experiment, farmers were asked to state how each scheme characteristics had affected their 
choices. That exercise revealed that the importance of the characteristic could be ranked according to how many of the 
respondents had stated that the characteristic had affected their choice to a large or very large extent: Most important 
was payment size (57 % of the respondents stated that payment size had affected their choice to a large or very large 
extent – which still leaves 43 % who state that their choice was not greatly affected by the suggested payment increase), 
followed by the release option (53%), contract length (48%), zone width (36%),  fertilizer use (34 %) and application 
method (23 %).  These qualitative results confirm the quantitative estimations from the choice experiments. In addition, 
they place the subsidy size as the top ranked characteristic of a subsidy scheme. 
 
The significant and positive alternative specific constant (ASC) indicates that there are some variables that are not 
captured in the model that induce farmers to prefer not to join any of the offered subsidy schemes. These omitted 
variables might include other types of requirements that could have been included that are more attractive for farmers 
(or more attractive levels of the included requirements) but they might also reflect a general reluctance to join subsidy 
schemes. To this end, the ASC can represent the entrance value needed to make farmers interested in joining a subsidy 
scheme as described in the choice experiment. The estimated ‘entrance value’ of 104 Euros/ha/year constitutes 77% of 
the payments presently offered to Danish farmers for implementing buffer zones along streams and lakes – hence, the 
estimated ‘entrance value’ far exceed the 20% limit as applies in the AES under the EU Common Agricultural Policy. 
This is, to our knowledge, the first attempt to quantify the entrance value that seems to be needed to overcome non-
economic barriers. Note however, that the large heterogeneity across farmers complicates the interpretation of ASC as a 
common entrance value. 
 
We tested for heterogeneity in mean with respect to farm size (whether farms with more than 200 hectares which 
involves 21 % of the sample behaved differently) and earlier participation (whether farmers who participated in an AES 
in 2009 behaved differently than those who had not – involving 9 % of the sample).´. No systematic relations were 
found.  
   
4. Discussion and conclusion 
Our findings concerning farmers’ perceptions of subsidy schemes help to understand some of the barriers that need to 
be overcome in order to increase their interest in subsidy schemes. First, our results suggest that one third of the Danish 
farmers did not find subsidy schemes an easy source of income. This matches the findings in Mettepenningen et al. 
(2009) p. 659, where 67 % of the respondents stated that the total costs incurred by AES exceeded the compensation 
payment. Second, there is a great deal of uncertainty among farmers about the consequences of enrolling in subsidy 
schemes with respect to the degree of overlap with other subsidy schemes, to what extent cross compliance will be used 
and there is a considerable lack of trust in authorities. These are fundamental barriers for increasing farmers’ interest in 
AES and they need to be addressed if further uptake is to be expected.  
 
We used the value that farmers place on obtaining assistance free of charge from the extension service to approximate 
their perceived costs of the administrative burden related to the application procedure. The results are promising in the 
sense that farmers attached a positive value to be released from the administrative burden and increasing the 
communication between farmers and the extension service might even be a way to reduce some of the above mentioned 
barriers related to uncertainty among farmers about the consequences of enrolling in subsidy schemes. Alternatively, 
uncertainty about the economic consequences of committing oneself to a subsidy scheme could be reduced by letting 
the payment size follow the development of relative in-and output prices. In that way, price uncertainty would be 
carried by the authorities rather than the farmers. 
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In the current agricultural policy, most AES are part of the cross compliance system which means that not fulfilling the 
requirements in the voluntary agreement can be very costly for the farmer. This suggests that farmers’ reluctance to 
joining subsidy schemes are not directly related to the payments of the subsidy scheme in question but to their overall 
direct payments. The risk of being caught in a cross compliance control seems to be a real barrier which needs to be 
addressed if AES are to be used in future environmental policy instruments. On one side, cross compliance increases 
farmers’ incentives for complying once they have committed to a subsidy scheme but it also reduces farmers desire to 
join subsidy schemes.  
 
The choice experiment indicated that farmers are indeed able to rank individual requirements in a subsidy scheme and 
to trade off requirements against the amount of subsidy. From a policy point of view, these results are promising as they 
suggest that farmers might be made interested in implementing buffer zones by offering them something other than 
simply higher payments.  Note that these results apply for 86% of the farmers in the sample. The remaining 14 % of the 
farmers consistently choose none of these which clearly indicates that these farmers will be very difficult to motivate to 
enrol in subsidy schemes. 
 
Generally, we found that flexibility is the keyword for catching farmers’ interest in subsidy scheme which supports 
findings by Wynn et al. (2001) and are also found recently in Ruto & Garrod (2009). More specifically, we found that 
overall flexibility of the contract (contract length and ability to cancel the contract) seemed to be more important than 
the actual practical restrictions in flexibility that the contracts induced (whether fertilizer could be used in the buffer 
zone, buffer zone width and practical assistance in the application process).  
 
Due to the case-oriented approach, the robustness of these interpretations needs to be addressed. For example, the 
results indicate that when contract length varies between 1 and 5 years, then it is more valuable to sign up for short-
termed contracts than for long-termed. Whether similar result holds when comparing 1 and 2 year contracts or 10 and 
20 year contracts in this particular case requires further analyses but earlier findings confirm that shorter contracts are 
generally preferred to longer. Also further studies including other characteristics such as to what extent farmers’ 
understanding of the precise environmental purpose of the AES would provide valuable input to future policy design 
just as more knowledge concerning the heterogeneity in farmer preferences for various combinations of requirements.  
 
Regardless whether the buffer zones are going to be implemented as part of a voluntary agreement or as a compulsory 
regulatory tool, our findings provide valuable information. It almost goes without saying, that in a voluntary context, it 
is important for the success of the subsidy schemes that they are made as attractive to the farmers as possible provided 
that the environmental goals and environmental budgets are met. Looking at compulsory buffer zones (or other 
requirements), the success in terms of compliance (and necessary payments) depends greatly on designing the 
requirements such that the alternative costs to the farmers are as small as possible – this will also reduce the need for 
monitoring and control. 
 
In the choice experiment we focused on how farmers valued the agreements. However, in order to evaluate the 
efficiency of agreements, we need also to assess the impacts on the environment. We found that farmers attached 
different costs to the requirements - but the environmental effects do also differ. The overall picture is that the more 
hectares that are farmed in an environmentally friendly way and the longer time pesticides and fertilizers are not used, 
the larger are the environmental benefits. To this end, the present approach to assess farmers’ preferences opens up for 
not only identifying trade off’s between payments and individual requirements but also for identifying environmental 
consequences of the individual requirements. For example, we found that the average farmer needs to be paid 128 Euros 
for enrolling in a 5 year contracts compared to a 1 year contract. The million Euro question is now whether  the 
environmental value of a longer contract will exceed the costs? This requires valuation of the environmental benefits 
which is subject for further research – but the contribution of the choice experiment method is that it is meaningful to 
ask the question – and eventually, answer it too. 
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Appendix 
 
The following text was used as introduction to the choice experiment. 
 
New subsidy schemes are offered for implementing buffer zones along hedgerows. Buffer zones along hedgerows 
provide space for flowering herbs and insects – and provide food for (among others) grey partridges and hares. It is 
important for the positive effects on the nature that the buffer zones are cut every year in late august. The buffer zone 
area is entitled to direct payments. The new subsidy scheme is not covered by cross compliance. Therefore, the size of 
the payments can be considered independently from the direct payments. The new subsidy schemes differ from each 
other with respect to the following six characteristics. On the next page, we show you a table that provides an overview 
of the subsidy schemes you will be confronted with. 
Figure 1:  An example of a choice set  
 
     Subsidy scheme A     Subsidy scheme  B     
Buffer zone width 6 m Flexible width (between 6 and 24 m)    
Contract length     1 year 5 years     
Option to cancel contract (without costs) Yes No     
Changed agricultural practice     Pesticide free Pesticide free 
Application method     Usual application procedure    Free assistance    
Size of subsidy     336 DDK 228 DDK   
 
Which of the subsidy schemes do you prefer? 
 
□ Subsidy scheme A 
□ Subsidy scheme B 
□ None of these 
 
 
